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THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN WEST VIRGINIA.-The
right to trial by jury in West Virginia is preserved by the
Constitution in both civil and criminal cases. The thir-
teenth section of the Bill of Rights, relating to civil cases,
reads as follows:
"In suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy exceeds twenty dollars exclusive of interest and
costs, the right of trial by jury, if required by either
party, shall be preserved; and in such suit before a jus-
tice a jury may consist of six persons. No fact tried by
a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any case than
according to the rules of the common law."
It will be noted that the Constitution provides that the
right shall be preserved "if required by either party." The
most obvious interpretation of this language would be to
the effect that, in any specific case, the right is guaranteed
only in the event that a party "requires" a jury, or, in other
words, affirmatively claims the right. If the Constitutional
1
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provision were not supplemented by statute, but were per-
mitted to be wholly self-executing, it would seem that, if a
party passively submitted to a trial by the court without
demanding a jury, he must be considered as having waived
his right to a jury trial; that the right is one to be demand-
ed, rather than one to be refused. But the legislature has
not seen fit to trust to the language of the Constitution as
defining the manner in which the right may be waived.
Section 29 of chapter 116 of the Code reads as follows:
. "In any case, except a case of felony, in which a trial
by jury would be otherwise proper, the parties or their
counsel by consent entered of record, may waive the
right to have a jury, and thereupon the whole matter of
law and fact shall be heard and determined, and judg-
ment given by the court; or by like consent, the jury may
consist of seven, and in that case a verdict shall be as
valid, and have the same effect as if it had been found
by a jury of twelve."
Of course this statute could not undertake in any degree
to subtract from the right conferred by the Constitution.
To the extent that it did so, it would be unconstitutional.
But it does not attempt to do so. The Constitution, in using
the words "if required by either party," plainly implies
that the right may be waived, if it does not impose on the
party the burden of affirmatively demanding the right. The
statute merely requires that the right shall be waived and
prescribes the manner of the waiver, thus throwing addi-
tional safeguards around the right guaranteed by the Con-
stitution. The Constitution preserves the right, subject to
a condition; the statute prescribes the operative terms of
the condition. Hence it will be seen that the question
whether a jury has properly been waived in any specific
case is a statutory question rather than a constitutional
question, and it has so been recognized by the court.1
'.It might be argued here, in accord with the reasoning of Judge Green in State
e. Cottril, infra, notes 12 and 13, that, notwithstanding the constitutional provision, a
statute would be necessary, as a mere procedural matter, in order to confer jurisdiction
on the court to try a case in lieu of a jury. It is believed, however, that such argument
should not prevail. Judge Green's inferences are based on an entirely different consti-
tutional provision, that relating to juries in criminal cases, from the language of which
no implied power in the parties to waive can be deduced. Section 169 of chapter 50 of
the Code, relating to the trial of appeal cases, provides that, where the sum In contro-
versy exceeds twenty dollars, there shall be a trial by jury if "either party so require."
This provision has been construed as dispensing with a jury unless one is demanded
and hence as permitting a silent waiver. See Lambert v. Inter-Urban Motor Co.. infra,
10. It will be noted that the constitutional provision relating to trials In civil cases
quoted above, in substantially identical language, provides that there shall be a trial by
jury, "if required by either party." Hence, in the trial of civil cases, the Constitution
itself, independently of statute, may be construed as impliedly conferring jurisdiction
on the court to act in lieu of a jury unless a jury is affirmatively demanded.
2
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Although there are indications to the contrary in some
of the earlier cases,2 the effect of the statute, as finally
construed by the court, seems to be that the right will not be
considered as waived by mere failure to claim it provided
the record evidences no positive acts which may be inter-
preted as an affirmative waiver. In Lipscomb v. Condon,3
the court says:
"Waiver of the right of trial by jury must be by con-
sent entered of record. It cannot be merely inferred
from the fact that the court tried the case without objec-
tion."
Although, as is further indicated in the opinion in Lipscomb
v. Condon, no presumption of waiver can arise when the rec-
ord is silent, still it is not required that the language of the
record shall speak in express terms of waiver. In King v.
Burdett,4 the court says:
"Where the record shows, 'that neither party required
a jury, and the court is substituted in lieu of a jury to try
the case,' and the case was tried by the court, this is
'consent entered of record' * * *."
A careful reading of the opinion in this case will indicate
that the operative words of waiver upon which the court
relied are the words "that neither party required a jury."
The words "and the court is substituted in lieu of a jury to
try the case" evidently are interpreted as merely indicating
the action of the court in pursuance of the waiver, and not
as evidencing acts of the parties contemplating a waiver.
Perhaps the latest views of the court as to what the rec-
ord must show are expressed in the comparatively recent
case of Salzer v. Schwartz,5 where it is said:
"The waiver need not be in express words; but if it
appears from the record that such waiver was intended
by conduct of the parties it is sufficient. But we repeat
that this must be shown from the record. If the record
be silent no waiver can be inferred."
The conclusion resulting from views expressed in the
cases cited would seem to be that, while nothing can be
inferred from mere silence-a silent record-as where the
2 See Phelps & Pound v. Smith & Co., 16 W. Va. 522 (1880).
a 56 W. Va. 416, 49 S. E. 392, 67 L. R. A. 670, 107 Am. St. Rep. 938 (1904).
4 12 W. Va. 688 (1878).
9 88 W. Va. 569, 107 S. E. 298 (1921).
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parties merely go to trial without demanding a jury and the
record is silent as to a waiver, yet where the record ex-
pressly-shows positive acts from which an intention to waive
may be inferred, such is sufficient, although the waiver be
not expressly stated in the record. It is perhaps needless
to suggest, however, that the safest practice in all cases
will be to have the record state an express and positive
waiver.
The statute quoted above requiring an express consent to
be entered of record is the one usually referred to by the
court as controlling the conditions of waiver. There is, how-
ever, another statute dealing with the matter of waiver.
Section 7 of chapter 131 of the Code reads as follows:
"The court, in an action at law, if neither party require
a jury, or if the defendant has failed to appear, shall
ascertain the amount the plaintiff is entitled to recover
in the action, if any, and render judgment accordingly."
This section, it will be noted, more nearly conforms to
the language of the Constitution, and, in the absence of the
section first quoted, might be sufficient to dispense with the
necessity of a positive waiver. It has not, however, been
recognized as warranting any departure from the require-
ments of the section in chapter 116, but rather has been
accepted as controlling the situation where the defendant
has suffered a default. In Salzer v. Schwartzu the question
arose whether this section refers to failure of the defendant
to appear to the action or failure to make a physical appear-
ance in court when the plaintiff asks for judgment. The
defendant had appeared to the action and pleaded at rules,
but he made no appearance in court when the case was
called for trial. The plaintiff, relying on the section last
quoted, waived a jury and submitted the case to the court.
The Supreme Court of Appeals, reversing the judgment,
held that the statute referred merely to failure to appear
to the action, and that, since the defendant had appeared
and pleaded at rules, a jury could have been dispensed
-with only in pursuance of section 29 of chapter 116 by con-
sent of both parties entered of record.
The statutes quoted above deal with jury trials in courts
of record; in other words, with common-law juries. A
' Idem.
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jury in a trial before a justice of the peace is not a common-
law jury7 and hence does not come within the purview of
of these statutes. The manner in which a party must as-
sert, or may waive, his right to a jury trial before a justice
of the peace is prescribed by chapter 50 of the Code."
The provisions of chapter 50 are very plain to the effect
that, in a trial before a justice, where a party is entitled
to a jury trial, the right will be waived unless affirmatively
claimed before the justice enters upon a trial of the case.
But in a trial de novo in a circuit court upon an appeal from
a justice of the peace, the jury, if one is impaneled, is a
common-law jury.9 Hence it might be inferred that in such
a trial the waiver of a jury would be controlled by the pro-
visions of section 29 of chapter 116; in other words, that a
jury could be waived only by consent of both parties en-
tered of record; and in the absence of any additional statu-
tory provision, it might be difficult to escape such a conclu-
sion. However, as is indicated in the recent case of Lambert
v. Inter-Urban Motor Company,0 the conditions of the waiver
in a trial on appeal are prescribed by still another statute.
In this case, the justice of the peace rendered judgment for
the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. The plaintiff,
appellee, appeared in the circuit court and, in the absence
of the defendant, waived a jury and submitted the case to
the court in lieu of a jury. The defendant, relying on the
authority of Salzer v. Schwartz,ll argued that, since it had
made an appearance to the action and an issue had been
made up before the justice, a jury could not be waived in
the circuit court without its consent entered of record. But
the Supreme Court of Appeals calls attention to the fact
that section 28 of article 8 of the Constitution provides that
"appeals shall be allowed from judgments of justices of the
peace in such manner as may be prescribed by law," and
that section 169 of chapter 50 of the Code, relating to the
trial of appeal cases, provides for a trial by jury only in the
event that "either party so require." Hence the court
reaches the conclusion that a jury in an appeal case is a
privilege to be demanded rather than a right to be waived,
and that since the defendant was not in court to demand a
v Richmond v. Henderson, 48 W. Va. 389, 37 S. E. 653 (1900).
8 §§71-78.
0 Lovings v. N~orfolk & W. R. Co., 47 W. Va. 582, 85 S. E. 962 (1900).
7o 99 W. Va. 135, 128 S. E. 81 (1925).
11 Supra, n. 5.
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jury, as it should have been, when the case was called for
trial, it would not be heard to complain. Salzer v. Schwartz
is distinguished on the ground that it was an action insti-
tuted in the circuit court, to which the provisions of section
29 of chapter 116 applied, and to which, of course, the
provisions of section 169 of chapter 60 could not apply.
While, in the absence of any specific statutory provision
relating to appeal cases, it might be argued that the provi-
sions of section 29 of chapter 116 should apply thereto, it
would be difficult to maintain such an argument in view
of the provisions of section 169 of chapter 50, unless the
Constitution requires something in the way of waiver that
the latter section does not require. But it has already
been indicated that even in cases* instituted in the circuit
courts the requirement that the waiver be by consent en-
tered of record is a statutory requirement and not a con-
stitutional requirement. Moreover, the language of section
:169 of chapter 50 more nearly conforms to the language
of the Constitution than does the language of section 29 of
chapter 116.
The right to trial by jury in criminal cases is guaranteed
B6y the fourteenth section of the Bill of Rights, which reads
as follows:
"Trials of crimes, and misdemeanors, unless herein
otherwise provided, shall be by a jury of twelve men, *
It will be noted that this provision of the Constitution
does not seem merely to undertake to preserve a right or
privilege which may be the subject of a waiver, as is done
in the constitutions of a majority of the states, 12 but seems
unequivocally to prescribe a positive and definite method of
trial. Hence it might be doubted whether the legislature
would have authority to enact a statute permitting waiver
of a jury trial in any criminal case where there was an
issue to be tried. It will be recalled, however, that section
29 of chapter 116 of the Code provdes that,
"In any case, except a case of felony, in which a trial
by jury would be otherwise proper, the parties or their
counsel by consent entered of record, may waive the right
to have a jury, and thereupon the whole matter of law
n See constitutional provisions of other states quoted by Judge Woods in his opinion
in State v. Cottrill, 31 W. Va. 162, 6 S. E. 428 (1888), at pp. 183 et seq.
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and fact shall be heard and determined, and judgment
given by the court; * * *."
The question of the constitutionality of this statute, to
the extent that it authorizes waiver of a jury in misde-
meanor cases, first came up for decision in the case of
State v. Cottrill.13 Judges Johnson and Woods were strongly
opposed to the constitutionality of the statute, so far as it
applies to criminal cases, chiefly on the ground that the
constitutional provision is not couched in terms of a right
or privilege, but prescribes an unqualified and emphatic
method of trial. On the other hand, Judges Snyder and
Green were as strongly convinced of its constitutionality,
and, the court being equally divided, the adjudication was
in favor of the statute. Judges Snyder and Green refused
to accept the literal construction placed on the language by
their colleagues. Furthermore, they gave much weight to
the fact that the bench and the bar had long acquiesced in
the constitutionality of the statute and particularly empha-
sized the fact that the provision was perpetuated in the
Constitution of 1872 in the light of this acquiescence.
Judge Green explains that the courts of many states hold
that, where a constitutional provision does not authorize
the waiver of a jury, still, although the constitution does
not prohibit a waiver, there could be no waiver unless a
statute authorized it, because otherwise the trial court
would not have jurisdiction to act in lieu of a jury, and he
believed that such would be true in this state. The argu-
ment is that the Constitution undertakes merely to prevent
the legislature from passing a statute dispensing with a
jury trial without consent of the parties, but does not other-
wise undertake to interfere with common-law methods of
procedure. The common-law method of trial in criminal
cases is by jury. Hence, since the parties, in the absence
of a statute so authorizing, could not by consent substitute
a method of trial contrary to the common-law method of
trial by jury, any effort to do so would be an unauthorized
attempt to bestow jurisdiction on the court. Viewed in
this light, the question is not one of merely waiving a right,
but of changing the method of procedure. The proposition
that parties by agreement cannot substitute their own meth-
ods of procedure for established methods of practice is
7
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generally sound and is recognized in other phases of trial
precedure. 14 However, the very argument of Judges John-
son and Woods was to the effect that the Constitution in-
tends to establish a definite and positive method of trial
and so intends to prevent the legislature, through the med-
ium of consent of the parties or otherwise, from bestowing
jurisdiction on the court to act in lieu of a jury in criminal
cases. In other words, the argument is that the Constitu-
tion deals with a matter of jurisdiction, and not with a
matter of right or privilege.
The holdihg of Judges Snyder and Green, right or wrong,
has been approved in subsequent cases.15 In the light of
their opinions, no reason is perceived, so far as the Consti-
tution is concerned, why it is not within the power of the
legislature to pass a statute permitting the waiver of a
jury in a felony case. In fact, Judge Green indicates that
such a waiver is permitted, *either by constitutional provi-
sion or by statute, in some of the states, and suggests no
obstacle to such a statutory waiver in this state, except cer-
tain procedural conditions prevailing in the earlier English
practice which never prevailed in this state and no
longer exist in England. 16 It would seem difficult to make
any distinction between misdemeanors and felonies on the
basis of our own constitutional provision.
The right to a jury in the trial of a criminal case before
a justice of the peace is regulated by section 226 of chapter
50 of the Code, in the following language:
1, Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Polly, Woods & Co., 14 Gratt. (Va.) 447, 471-477
(1858).
10 State v. Griggs, 34 W. Va. 78, 11 S. E. 740 (1890) ; State v. Denoon, 84 W. Va.
189, 11 S. E. 1003 (1890) ; State v. Alderton, 50 W. Va. 101, 40 S. E. 850 (1901).
11 "Now, from Bish. Crim. Pro., ch. 25, 'On the Doctrine of the Waiver of Rights,'
it would appear that, as prisoners anciently accsed in England of treason or felony
were not allowed counsel to assist them in their defence before a jury, but It was
deemed a part of the duty of the judge to assist them, and act as their counsel, there
was in such cses but very limited room for the operation of this doctrine of the waiver
of rights by the accused; for the waiver of a right by the accused, proceeding from
the advice of the court, would be in its nature a judicial error, of which the accused
ought to be allowed to avail himself. In this way it might happen that a particular
right of such criminal could not be waived; and this having been established as law,
though the reason on which it was based had ceased when the accused was permitted
in every criminal case to have the aid of counsel, yet some courts would hold that such
particular right could, after this change in the law, be waived: while others would still
adhere to the ancient law, and hold that such particular right could not be waived.
Accordingly, we find much conflict of authority as to whether now a person accused
of felony can waive certain rights; and among the cases in which there Is such con-
flict is the question whether a person accused of felony can effectually waive his conasti-
tutional right of trial by a jury even when permitted to do so by statute law. But it
has never been anywhere questioned that his trial by jury might, if the court was author-
ized to try the case by consent of parties, be waived by the accused in a misdemeanor
case; for in such case the accused was always permitted to appear by counsel, and
always could have waived a right of trial by jury." Opinion of Judge Green In State
v. Cottrill supra, n. 12, at p. 211.
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"When the penalty authorized by law is a fine exceed-
ing five dollars, or imprisonment, the accused shall be
entitled to a trial by twelve jurors, or a less number if
demanded, under the regulations respecting such trials in
civil suits before justices; * * * "
When a criminal case is appealed from a justice's court,
section 230 of chapter 50 provides that "the court shall
proceed to try the case as upon indictment or presentment."
It remains to discuss briefly the effect of the last sentence
of the thirteenth section of the Bill of Rights, which reads
as follows:
"No fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined
in any case than according to the rules of the common
law."
The jury mentioned in this provision has been construed
to mean a common-law jury.17 Hence, of course, it would
apply to all common-law actions instituted in courts of
record, and, as we have seen,' 8 would apply to cases tried
on appeal from justices of the peace. The effect of the
provision, in general, is that a trial by a common-law jury
must be reviewed by the common-law writ of error or by
some of the extraordinary legal remedies. Otherwise, it
could not be "re-examined * * * according to the rules
of the common law." Under the earlier decisions,19 it was
conceived that this provision applied to a trial by a jury
before a justice of the peace. Since a justice's court is not
a court of record, such a trial could not be reviewed in a
circuit court by writ of error, a writ of error being appro-
priate only for purposes of reviewing a judgment rendered
by a court of record. Neither could there be a trial de novo
in the circuit court on appeal, as has always been proper
when a justice has tried a case without a jury, since such a
re-examination would not be "according to the rules of the
common law." . Consequently, such cases were brought up
to the circuit courts for review by a writ of certiorari.20 But
in the later case of Richmond v. Henderson,2' the court, re-
versing the earlier decisions requiring a writ of certiorari
in such cases, held that a jury in a case tried before a justice
11 Richmond v. Henderson, supra, n. 7.
Lovings v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., supra, n. 9.
10 See cases cited in the syllabus of Richmond v. Henderson, supra.
so Sdem.
22 Supra, note 7 and 17.
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of the peace is not a common-law jury, and hence that there
is no reason why such cases may not be appealed and tried
de novo in the circuit courts like cases tried by a justice with-
out a jury. Wherefore, a writ of certiorari is no longer
allowed in such cases.
Since, when the amount in controversy, exclusive of in-
terest and costs, is fifty dollars or less, an action cannot be
brought in a circuit court, and a jury in a trial before a
justice of the peace is held not to be a common-law jury, it
might be conceived that both parties in such a case, where
the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs,
exceeds twenty dollars, are deprived of the right to a com-
mon-law jury guaranteed by the Constitution. Likewise,
since, when the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest
and costs, is three hundred dollars or less, the plaintiff may
sue before a justice of the peace, it might be thought that
in such a case, where the amount in controversy, exclusive
of interest and costs, exceeds twenty dollars, the defendant
would be deprived of his constitutional right to a trial by
a common-law jury. However, as Jildge Brannon indicates
in Lovings v. Norfolk & W. R. Company,22 since either party,
when the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and
costs, exceeds fifteen dollars, has an absolute right to appeal to
the circuit court, where he may have a trial de novo by a
common-law jury, the right to the common-law jury guaran-
teed by the constitution is not denied, but merely withheld
until the trial de novo on appeal. It would seem that this con-
sideration alone, if no other, would compel the court to hold
that a jury in the trial of an appeal case must be a common-
law jury. Wherefore, since a common-law jury is a jury
composed of twelve men, it was held in Lovings v. Norfolk &
W. R. Company that §169 of chapter 50 of the Code, so far as
it undertakes to authorize a jury of six men in the trial of
an appeal case, is unconstitutional.
-L. C.
, Supra, notes 9 and 18.
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